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PART I: PRIVATE LAW
TORTS
by
Page Keeton *
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Products liability law has become unnecessarily complex, primarily because recovery for a particular kind of loss may often be obtained under
three separate theories: negligence in tort, strict liability in tort,' and strict
liability for breach of warranty.2 All three theories are concurrently available in Texas when a damaging event, produced by a defectively dangerous
product, results in a claim for damages arising from physical harm to
persons or property.' Although choice of theory would be of no practical
importance if the liability and damage rules were equivalent under all three
theories, the actual litigation process is confused because the extent of
liability may vary, depending on the theory of the action. Consequently, a
claimant must sometimes seek findings related to two or more theories in
order to obtain maximum possible relief. For example, in Texas, voluntary
assumption of the risk is not a defense to recovery on a theory of negligence;4 it may, however, preclude recovery on a theory of strict liability in
tort, and possibly on a theory of breach of warranty.' Similarly, contributory
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University; LL.D., Southern
Methodist University. W. Page Keeton Professor of Law in Torts, University of Texas.
I. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1975); Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505
S.W.2d 682, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), writ ref'd n.r.e. percuriam, 513 S.W.2d 4
(Tex. 1974); K & S Oil Well Serv., Inc. v. Cabot Corp., 491 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974). The court in Borel stated:
Although we agree that a reference to 'breach of warranty' in a products
liability charge may be unnecessarily confusing in some cases, since that is the
language of contracts not torts, we are persuaded that no prejudice resulted to the
defendant from its use in this case. . . . With respect to breach of implied
warranty, the court specifically equated 'unfitness' or 'unmerchantability' with
the 'unreasonably dangerous' standard of strict liability in tort. Viewing the
charge as a whole, we think that the jury fully understood that liability could be
imposed only if the product was unreasonably dangerous.
Id. at 1091. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ
dism'd).
3. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
4. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Rosas v. Buddies Food Store,
518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1975). See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30Sw. L.J. 1,26 (1976). See also Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336,491 P.2d 1147 (1971); Siragusa v. Swedish
Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15
Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
5. The defense still exists in strict liability cases when the injured party voluntarily
exposes himself to the risk posed by the defective product with knowledge and appreciationof
the danger. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519
S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Ethicon,. Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, no writ). See also Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1976).
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negligence is a defense that either bars or diminishes recovery on a negligence theory, depending on whether the jury finds the plaintiff's negligence
to be greater than that of the defendant or defendants. 6 On the other hand,
while contributory negligence is not a defense to recovery on a theory of
strict liability in tort, 7 the Texas Supreme Court recently defined unforeseeable misuse as a defense that mitigates recovery, based on findings of
comparative causation.' Thus, a claimant seeking maximum recovery should
proceed on several theories since the hazards of litigation differ for each.
The resulting complexity of litigation strongly suggests that development of
a single theory of recovery for a particular kind of loss would promote a
more efficient and just administration of products liability claims.
A.

Types of Claimants and Losses

The issues presented by the law of products liability may be clarified by
categorizing such claims by class of claimant and type of loss suffered.
Within this framework, several cases decided since the last Annual Survey
have clarified the law regarding theories of recovery and their applicability
to particular kinds of losses. 9
1. Claimant as Bystander Whose Person or Property Is Injured as Result of
Product Defect.
Texas permits such a claimant to recover under both tort theories of
negligence and strict liability."0 Purchasers and users were the first to receive tort protection from dangerously defective products since strict liability in tort was an outgrowth of warranty liability." Yet, unlike bystanders,
consumers and users have had an opportunity to inspect for defects, and to
limit their contacts to articles made by reputable manufacturers. 2 Subsequent extension of tort actions to bystanders for physical harm reflects a
societal policy to hold manufacturers responsible through liability for accidents attributable to the "dangerousness" of their products. 3
6.

For a discussion of various problems connected with comparative negligence and

contribution see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 7-16 (1974).
7. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520
S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8.

General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). See also Magic Chef,

Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9. Particular note should be given to Nobility Homes v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.
1977), and Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 553 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), which are discussed in categories 4 and 6 infra.
10. Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
I1. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965).
12. See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 583, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652, 657 (1969).
13. Traditional policy considerations underlying tort protection afford greater protection to
bodily integrity than to economic interests. Whereas purely economic loss is suffered solely by
the purchaser, physical injury to a person or property is part of a larger accident problem in
society as a whole; thus, it deserves greater control through deterrent effect of risk allocation.
For a general discussion of risk shifting to those producing dangerous products see Keeton,
Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329
(1966). See also Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 35
(1973).

1978]

TORTS

2. Claimant as Non-purchasing User Whose Person or Property Is Injured
as Result of Product Defect. 4
As in the case of a bystander, recovery for a claimant in this category has
been available only on the two tort theories of negligence and strict liability.
Recovery under a warranty theory has traditionally been barred because the
claimant is not a party to or a third-party beneficiary of any contract with
anyone in the marketing chain.' 5 This limitation lessens litigation complexity
because only purchasers and third-party beneficiaries of the purchaser's
contract may proceed on warranty-contract theories of recovery. Moreover,
if the doctrine of third-party beneficiaries is applied realistically, its use
should be narrowly limited. Because third persons and bystanders may
recover in tort based on the product's defect as an alternative theory to
seller's negligence, the Business and Commerce Code need not be amended
to ensure adequate recovery to all kinds of users for damages attributable to
physical harm.' 6
3. Claimant as Purchaser or Member of Purchaser'sImmediate Family
Whose Person or Property Is Injured as Result of Product Defect.
Like most other states, Texas permits such claimants to recover on all
three theories of negligence in tort, strict liability in tort, and breach of
warranty. 17
The Business and Commerce Code currently allows recovery on a warranty theory for personal injury to purchasers or family members. The Code
provisions, however, were drafted prior to the development of the theory of
strict liability in tort. Thus, the appropriate provisions of the Business and
Commerce Code should be amended to limit such damages to economic
losses resulting from failure of the product to meet minimum requirements
of quality and efficiency. While recovery for physical harm would remain
available on tort theories, such an amendment would enable the supreme
court to apply uniform rules for recovery to both outsiders and purchasers and members of purchasers' families. Since tort liability is imposed
to protect consumers from physical harm, risk allocation should not differ
according to the victim's status as purchaser or outsider.
14. See Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960); O.M.'Franklin
Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Russell &
Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ).
15. In Texas, however, section 2.318 of the Business and Commerce Code is expressly
neutral and leaves the issue open to judicial resolution: "[Tihis Chapter does not provide
whether anyone other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of
quality made to the buyer .... " TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Vernon 1968).
16. Availability of tort theories to users and members of the user's family is consistent with
tort policy to control risk imposition for personal injuries, including physical harm to users or to
the property of users. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
17. Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974) (drugs, strict tort
theory); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (permanent wave
preparation, strict tort theory). See the Business and Commerce Code provisions on recovery
of consequential damages for an injury to a person or property, TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.715 (Vernon 1968), and on the limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person
in the case of consumer goods, id. § 2.719.
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4.

Claimant as Purchaser (Both Commercial User and Consumer-Purchaser) Whose Intangible Economic Loss Is Caused by Product's Poor
Quality or Failure to Fulfill Purchaser's Expectations.
Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 8 in which the plaintiff was a purchaser
of a mobile home, falls within this category. The immediate seller had gone
out of business and could not be located at the time the claim was filed; thus,
the plaintiff sought recovery from the manufacturer alone. The trial court,
sitting without a jury, found that the mobile home was defectively constructed and was unfit for the purposes for which it was sold. Damages of $8,750
were awarded as the difference between the reasonable market value of the
mobile home at the time of purchase and the original contract price. The
Beaumont court of civil appeals affirmed, and the judgments of both courts,
against the manufacturer, were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas.
Although recovery was based on a contract-warranty theory, the supreme
court held that privity is no longer required to hold a manufacturer responsible for economic loss resulting from breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability. '9
Additionally, the plaintiff had successfully alleged the manufacturer's
negligence in both design and construction of the mobile home. The supreme
2
court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff on the negligence theory,
noting that "consumers have other remedies for economic loss against
persons with whom they are not in privity. One of these remedies is a cause
in negligence."12' Because only economic loss had resulted, however, the
court's approval of an action in negligence ignores traditional policies underlying the imposition of tort liability, policies which allocate liability to the
manufacturer as the better risk-bearer of harm resulting from risks that
inhere in the use of his product.
5.

Claimant as Non-purchaser Whose Intangible Economic Loss Is
Caused by Product's Poor Quality or Failure to Meet Purchaser's Objectives. 22

6.

Claimant as Purchaser of Product Damaged as Result of Its Own
Defect.
Such a claim was upheld by the Amarillo court of civil appeals in Mid
Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service. 23 The purchaser, an operator of a crop-spraying service, purchased a used airplane on
an "as is" basis. Twenty-one days later, and after thirty hours of engine
time, the engine failed in flight while the airplane was spraying a field. The
pilot landed the aircraft on a rough country road, damaging the fuselage and
wings. The court held that the plaintiff could recover on either a warranty
18. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
19. Id.at 81.
20. Id. at 83. The court was bound to uphold judgment on the negligence theory because
the defendant did not challenge that ground on appeal. Id. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Cowley, 468 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. 1971); City of Deer Park v. State, 154 Tex. 174, 187,
188, 275 S.W.2d 77, 84, 85 (1954).
21. 557 S.W.2d at 83.
22. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
23. 553 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ granted).
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theory or on the tort theories of negligence and strict liability. With regard to
the "as is" sale agreement, however, the court ruled that such language
excluded all liability under a contractual warranty. Nevertheless, it did not
eliminate the strict liability for physical harm imposed by tort law. 24 The
opinion in Mid Continent suggested, however, that parties to an "as is"
contract can disclaim strict tort liability, for physical harm to the product
itself, and perhaps liability on a negligence theory as well, by very clear and
25
specific language in the agreement.
A distinction should be made between the type of "dangerous condition"
that causes damage only to the product itself and the type that is dangerous
to other property or persons. A hazardous product that has harmed something or someone can be labeled as part of the accident problem; tort law
seeks to protect against this type of harm through allocation of risk. In
contrast, a damaging event that harms only the product should be treated as
irrelevant to policy considerations directing liability placement in tort.
Consequently, if a defect causes damage limited solely to the property,
26
recovery should be available, if at all, on a contract-warranty theory.
7.

Claimant as Purchaser Seeking Recovery from Supplier of Product's
Defective Component Part Which Damaged Product.
In this situation the component part is dangerous only because it has not
functioned as intended and has resulted in deterioration or destruction of the
product, or the building of which it was a part. It is not dangerous to people;
its risk extends to tangible things to the extent that it is a component part of
such things. Facts within this category were presented to the San Antonio
court of civil appeals in Hovenden v. Tenbush .27
The plaintiff, a commercial enterpriser, had entered into an agreement
with a building contractor for the construction of a commercial building. The
plaintiff and his architect selected used Mexican brick for construction of
the exterior walls. After the building was completed, the walls began shedding mortar. The court found the deterioration had occurred because the
used brick was unsuited for its designated use. Even though the case
concerned a commercial transaction and a commercial type of loss, the
appellate court held that the seller was subject to liability on a tort theory.2 8
Arguably, the contract between the purchaser and the seller should govern liability of the seller. The mere fact that the brick was not suitable for its
proposed use does not justify requiring the seller to guarantee that it would
be suitable unless (1) the seller represented that it would be suitable 29 and (2)
24. Id. at 941.
25. Id.
26. See Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975)
(engine overheated and was eventually ruined); accord, Long v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga.
App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976) (while being moved, portable tobacco barn collapsed because
of defect).
27. 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
28. Id. at 305-06.
29. See Gorbett Bros. Steel Co. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 533 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Parks v. Glidden Co., 433 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cruz v. Ansul Chem. Co., 399 S.W.2d 944, 949
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Craftsman Glass, Inc. v. Cathey, 351
S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ).

6
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the purchaser relied on the seller's judgment in the matter.30 If these requirements were met, however, an implied warranty of fitness for the particular
3
purpose would arise. '
The extension of strict tort liability to those who supply component parts
is currently unsettled, even in cases limited to physical harm to persons.
Judicial reluctance to permit strict tort liability is justified in the case of an
assembler who incorporates into the ultimate product a part unsuited for its
use, unless he relies on the component part seller to furnish an appropriate
part.32
A claimant of the kind contemplated in the fourth and fifth categories set
forth above will not be able to recover in Texas on a theory of strict tort
liability because his claim is for an economic loss attributable to the inferior
quality of the product, or its inability to meet the purchaser's expectations.
Historically, the remedies of a disappointed purchaser have been (1) a

contract action seeking damages for breach of an express or implied warranty of quality; (2) a tort action seeking damages for deceit or fraud; and (3) an

action for rescission of the contract.33 In Nobility Homes a central issue was
whether privity of contract between the purchaser and the defendant manufacturer is an essential element of liability under a warranty theory. The fact

that the court resolved that issue in favor of the claimant, however, does not
mean that warranty theories of liability are no longer important.
Other important issues will also be affected by the holding in Nobility
Homes. For example, the theory upon which recovery is sought will signifi-

cantly affect: (1) the type of quality deficiency that will subject the seller to
liability under the warranty provisions of the Business and Commerce Code;
(2) the validity and effect of "as is" and "disclaimer" clauses; (3) the effect
of an obvious defect on recovery; (4) the effect of failure to give prompt

notification of a defect after it was discovered or should have been discovered in the exercise of ordinary care; (5) the ability of someone other
than a purchaser to recover for economic loss suffered; (6) the appropriate

conflict of laws rule to apply; and (7) the time when a cause of action arises
and the applicable limitations period.
B.

Privity of Contract, Economic Loss, and Recovery in Tort

The opinion of the supreme court in Nobility Homes recognized the
division of American courts on whether to extend strict liability in tort to
30. See Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974); Brown v.
Asgrow Seed Co., 379 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
31. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Vernon 1968).
32. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963) (court refused to hold maker of flawed component part strictly liable
to ultimate purchaser when assembler could be sued). But see Clark v. Bendix Corp., 42 App.
Div. 2d 727, 728, 345 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (1973) (intermediate New York appellate court allowed
recovery against component part maker on both tort theory and breach of warranty theory). See
also Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975) (imposed liability on seller
of component part only on theory of negligence where seller supplied chemicals to a fabricator
of firecracker assembly kits sold in violation of federal law); Taylor v. Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 516
F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1975) (strict liability for design defect of component part not available against
its manufacturers). Contra, Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975), noted in Keeton,
Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. I, 6 (1976).
33. See Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEXAS L. REV. I (1953), for a
discussion of the law in this area relating to an economic loss.
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pure economic loss situations.34 No doubt some of the courts that approved

this extension of strict liability in tort did so in order to provide the purchaser with a cause of action against the manufacturer, thereby avoiding the

contractual requirement of privity of contract for recovery. The supreme
court, however, eliminated this particular requisite for recovery, even on a
contract theory.3 5 Such an approach appears to be sounder than extending

strict liability in tort to recovery for pure economic loss. Nevertheless,
substantial authority supports the position that privity of contract should be

a prerequisite to recovery for those economic losses which are unaccompanied by physical harm to the person or his property.36
Where products do not have defects that endanger others, it can be argued
that they can not be so poor in quality as to be unworthy of sale if the price is
right. Therefore, the immediate contract between the retailer and the userpurchaser, as well as the contract between the manufacturer and its market-

ing purchaser, is of utmost importance with regard to whether the userpurchaser should be permitted to recover against the manufacturer. Notwithstanding the obvious difficulty in evaluating immediate contracts in

cases when the retailer is unavailable, much can be said for disregarding
marketing privity, especially when the user-purchaser is an ordinary
consumer rather than a commercial purchaser. Although the supreme court
in Nobility Homes assured consumers of additional remedies, including a
cause of action in negligence, 37 that action has traditionally been unavailable. In the past the only tort action available to a disappointed purchaser

was an action of deceit for fraud; the only contract action available in such
situations was based on breach of warranty, which is also the single contract
action for disappointed purchasers provided in the Uniform Commercial
Code.38
34. 557 S.W.2d at 79. The two leading judicial opinions in this area are Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965),, and Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
35. Privity of contract as an element required to recover for economic loss on a warranty
theory was also abrogated by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Morrow v. New Moon Homes,
Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976). In Morrow the couct said that "there is no satisfactory
justification for a remedial scheme which extends the warranty action to a consumer suffering
personal injuries or property damage but denies similar relief to the consumer 'fortunate'
enough to suffer only direct economic loss." Id. at 291.
36. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 148
N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'd without opinion, 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956)
(problem related to direct recovery by the ultimate purchaser against the manufacturer made
apparent). The court stated that:
If the ultimate user were allowed to sue the manufacturer in negligence merely
because an article with latent defects turned out to be bad when used in 'regular
service' without any accident occurring, there would be nothing left of the citadel
of privity and not much scope for the law of warranty. There seems to me to be
good reason for maintaining that, short of an accident, the citadel should be
preserved. Manufacturers would be subject to indiscriminate lawsuits by persons
having no contractual relations with them, persons who could thereby escape the
limitations, if any, agreed upon in their contract of purchase. Damages for inferior
quality, per se, should better be left to suits between vendors and purchasers
since they depend on the terms of the bargain between them.
Id. at 290 (emphasis added). See also Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965) (jury
found that tractor performed inadequately and plaintiff suffered economic loss, but plaintiff
was denied recovery against wholesaler).
37. 557 S.W.2d at 83.
38. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315. The Texas Legislature enacted the 1965 Uniform Commercial
Code as part of the Texas Business and. Commerce Code to take effect on Sept. I, 1967.
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In dealing with a similar problem, the Supreme Court of Ohio reached a
different result.3 9 In a case involving an automobile that squeaked and
rattled, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently failed to inspect
the automobile properly prior to delivery; he claimed that such negligence
proximately caused him the loss of $1,500, the difference between the
purchase price and the market value of the automobile. The court held that
pecuniary loss of the benefit of the bargain was not recoverable on a
negligence theory because the defendant's acts caused no damage to person
or property.
Nevertheless, the position of the Texas Supreme Court finds support in
the fact that the existing warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act are inadequate to give the
ordinary consumer, as opposed to the commercial enterpriser, significant
protection from inferior merchandise. In the absence of an express warranty, the Code, drafted over twenty years ago, provides only an implied
warranty of merchantability4" and an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.4 Thus, a defective product such as a mobile home may
be worth no more than half its original purchase price and, at the same time,
be merchantable or suitable for human habitation under the Code's warranty
standards. The best solution to this problem, however, is not to open the
door to a myriad of negligence suits seeking recovery from sellers in the
marketing chain for purely economic loss. Rather, the Code sections on
warranties should be amended.
C. Liability Disclaimers and Physical Harm to the Product Itself
Mid Continent Aircraft42 concerned the liability of a seller, in an "as is"
sale, for the loss attributable to a defect in the aircraft that resulted in
physical harm to the product itself. The law relating to the validity of
contract clauses that attempt to relieve one contracting party of tort liability
is clouded with a great deal of uncertainty. 3 Properly stated, the issue is to
what extent a contracting party may be allowed to accept the risk of losses
attributable to what would otherwise be the actionable and tortious conduct
of the other. Generally speaking, a person can agree by contract to accept a
risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct
unless the agreement is held invalid as contrary to public policy." That
proposition, however, does not answer the policy question of whether the
particular agreement should be regarded as illegal and unenforceable.
Courts must consider as vitally important, any inequality of the bargaining
position of the contracting parties as well as the effect that the enforcement
of such an agreement would have in frustrating the policy considerations
underlying the tort rules of liability. The comment to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
39. Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583, 588 (1965),
(quoting Prosser, Products Liability in General, 36 CLEV. B.A.J. 149, 174-75 (1965)).
40. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Vernon 1968).
41. Id. § 2.315.
42. 553 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
43. If a contract clause is considered unconscionable, the court may refuse to enforce it.
See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Vernon 1968).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
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The consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached
to and accom4
panying the product into the consumer's hands. 1
Disclaimer clauses, however carefully worded, do not appear to alter the
average consumer's ability to recover for personal injuries under either
negligence or strict liability theories. The precise question discussed in Mid
Continent Aircraft, however, was not the enforceability of a personal injury
disclaimer but the validity of an agreement between enterprisers that purported to relieve the seller of tort liability for physical harm to the subject
matter of the sale. The majority and the dissenting judge agreed that liability
for damage to the property could be shifted by agreement, but differed on
the issue of whether this type of loss could be recovered on a tort theory as
well as on a contract theory.46 The majority held that a contractual disclaimer does not eliminate the strict liability imposed by law.47 The dissenting
4
judge concluded that recovery was obtainable only on a contract theory. 1
One difficulty with the majority view is that the line between a defect that
results in economic loss and one that results in physical harm to the product
itself is not always easy to draw. When the product itself is physically
harmed, the principal reason for recognizing the existence of a tort theory
for recovery is to invalidate a no-liability clause when the transaction is
between a seller and an ordinary consumer. Consequently, if a defect in a
mobile home causes a fire that destroys the mobile home, liability would
obtain without regard to a disclaimer clause. 4 9 In Jig the Third Corp. v.
Puritan Marine Insurance Underwriters Corp.50 a shrimp boat sank in the
Gulf of Mexico. The contract of sale contained a disclaimer clause but it was
not broad enough to exclude liability for negligence. The majority held that
tort theories were available and the disclaimer provision did not clearly
exclude recovery on a negligence theory. As in Mid Continent Aircraft, the
dissenting judge in Jig the Third took the position that recovery should be
obtainable only on a contract theory.
II.

JOINT TORTFEASORS

During this survey period Texas courts addressed several important issues
in dealing with the proper allocation of accident costs between two or more
45. Id. § 402A, comment m (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
337(3) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977), which states that "[a] term exempting a seller of a product
from his special tort liability for physical harm to a user or consumer is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy unless the term is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy
underlying that liability." The exception is for the rare situation when a term of this kind is
included in a contract between two merchants for the sale of an experimental product.
46. 553 S.W.2d at 941.
47. The court cited two of the leading cases concerning tort liability for harm to the product
itself: Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) (upheld
recovery on a tort theory but recognized validity of clearly drafted disclaimer clauses); Sterner
Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974) (strict liability in tort cannot be
waived no matter how carefully disclaimer clause is drawn).
48. Id. at 943 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
49. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alas. 1977) (court held that recovery would be
obtainable on theory of strict liability in tort).
50. 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975).
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legally responsible parties. In discussing these cases, the term joint tortfeasor will be used broadly to include a victim who was himself guilty of the
tortious conduct that proximately caused the accident.
A. Unforeseeable Misuse as a Defense in Products Liability Cases
In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins,5' a products liability case, the
plaintiff's harm arose out of a single car accident in which the jury found (1)
unforeseeable misuse of the car by the plaintiff 52 and (2) defective design of
the car's carburetor. 3 The jury further found both the misuse and the design
defect to be producing causes of the accident. The case, therefore, involved
the proper allocation of the costs of an accident between victims and
suppliers of products when the accident results from the combination of
both product defect and unforeseeable misuse by the victim. 54 On appeal,
the supreme court held that misuse of a product would be a defense if (1) the
misuse was not reasonably foreseeable by the supplier of the defective
product, and (2) if such misuse was a proximate cause and not simply a
producing cause of the accident.5 5 To constitute a proximate cause, harm
from an event of the kind that occurred must be reasonably foreseeable.
Therefore, a finding that the unforeseeable misuse was a producing cause is
not sufficient to establish the defense since it must be a proximate cause. In
effect the court is saying that (1) the misuse must be the kind that was
unforeseeable by the supplier of the product, (2) the misuser must have been
negligent, and (3) his negligence must have been a proximate cause of the
event from which the injury arose. Even if successful, the defense does not
bar plaintiff's recovery; it merely diminishes the amount of that recovery.
The jury, in considering the totality of the harm incurred by the plaintiff, is
to apportion causation to the respective parties-to the plaintiff for the
misuse and to the defendant for the product defect.
Quantification of fault is theoretically possible since the quality of each
party's fault in the case of a single and indivisible injury is almost always
different. But to quantify causation between two or more parties is impossible when the conduct of each was a prerequisite to the resulting harm.
Although recognizing this problem, the supreme court apparently held that
the jury must apportion the damages in some fair and just manner. The
difficulty of framing an appropriate question for the jury without knowing
the conduct of the defendant that caused the accident is apparent. For
example, should the questions to the jury be framed in a negligence theory
or a strict liability theory; furthermore, for each theory the appropriate
defenses must also be considered. The combinations and permutations of
questions increase unnecessarily the complexity of the litigation process.
The defenses to recovery on a theory of strict liability and negligence should
be identical so as to avoid these complexities. The solution is a pro rata
51.

548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), noted in 31 Sw. L.J. 940 (1977).

52.

Id. at 348.

53. Id. at 347.
54. The particular conduct of Hopkins was an alteration of the carburetor. The jury found
that this was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant manufacturer. Id. at 348-49.
55. Id. at 351. See also Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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sharing of the costs of accidents among those legally responsible for such
accidents, under both negligence and strict liability. Such a general principle
would further the policy considerations behind rules that impose tort liability on those engaging in socially desirable activities without creating undue
complexity.
B. Products Liability and Misconduct of Third Persons
In Hopkins the court stated that misuse of a product, however abnormal
or unforeseeable, that operated as a proximate cause of a damaging event
does not bar recovery by a bystander against the seller of a defective
56
product when the defect was a producing cause of the event. In fixing
limits to legal liability, it is not clear that any distinction should be drawn
between suppliers of products and negligent users of products. This is not to
suggest that the proximate cause rules established by the courts to fix
liability limits on a negligence theory are unassailable. In most states,
including Texas, reasons commonly given for concluding that the defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause include: (1) harm to the plaintiff
was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant; (2) harm from the kind or
type of damaging event was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant;
and (3) another's conduct was a "new and independent intervening cause"
or a "superseding cause." 57 The notion behind these rules has been that the
plaintiff's injury Was not sufficiently related to the defendant's faulty acts to
justify holding him liable. Nearly all courts, execpt Texas', 8 have apparently
adopted the requirement in products liability litigation that the defect in the
product supplied be a proximate cause, accompanied by the same limitations
listed above. Thus, a product defect would not be a proximate cause if (1)
harm to the plaintiff was not reasonably foreseeable from a defect of the
kind that was proven, (2) harm from the kind of damaging event that
occurred was not reasonably foreseeable from a defect of the kind that was
proven, or (3) another's conduct was "a new and independent cause" or
"superseding cause." Since the supreme court decision in Hoover v. Franklin Serum Co. , Texas law requires only that the defect be a producing
cause. 6° It is not clear, however, that producing cause means only "but for"
cause. Nevertheless, the Hopkins decision indicates that in Texas the supplier of a defective product is liable for all factual consequences.
In GeneralMotors Corp. v. Simmons 6I defendant Johnson failed to stop at
a traffic signal and drove his employer's truck into the left front door of the
car driven by Simmons. The impact bent the frame of the door on Simmons'
car and exploded the laminated glass in the car window into Simmons' eyes,
blinding him. The jury found the glass to be defective and to be a producing
56. 548 S.W.2d at 351.
57. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
58. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ); Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. 444 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.1969).
60. See Rourke v.Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.1975).
61. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
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cause of the accident. Prior to the trial, Simmons entered into a type of
settlement commonly referred to as a "Mary Carter" agreement with Johnson and his employer, Feld, pursuant to which Simmons agreed (1) not to
sue Johnson and Feld and (2) to pay Feld fifty percent of each dollar
Simmons recovered against General Motors until Feld received $200,000.
Feld and Johnson remained in the law suit as named defendants, but the
existence of the settlement agreement or its nature was not disclosed to the
jury. The jury was, however, informed that Simmons, Johnson, and Feld
were allies against General Motors. The trial court rendered judgment on a
jury verdict for one million dollars, and denied General Motors either
contribution or indemnity. The court of civil appeals6 2 held that as a matter
of law Johnson's negligence was a proximate cause of all the direct consequences of the accident, including the harm resulting from the defective side
window; consequently, General Motors was awarded contribution from
Johnson and Feld. Additionally, Johnson and Feld were not entitled to
indemnity, and, therefore, the judgment was reduced by one-half because
6
the plaintiff had settled with one of two joint tortfeasors.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the exclusion of the evidence as to
the existence of the "Mary Carter" agreement was reversible error because
the financial interest that Feld acquired in the outcome of the plaintiff's case
against General Motors was a proper subject of cross-examination and
proof. The supreme court did, however, agree with the court of civil appeals
regarding the issues of contribution and indemnity between Feld and General Motors.
Indemnity, as distinguished from contribution, was a creation of the
common law, adopted to prevent unjust enrichment. In regard to contribution, the common law generally made no attempt to work out equitable
arrangements between wrongdoers. 64 Therefore, just as contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery, so one joint tortfeasor who was held
liable for the entire damage incurred by plaintiff could not recover contribution from the other tortfeasors. 65 With the emergence of judicially devised
exceptions to the contributory negligence bar, such as the doctrines of
discovered peril and last clear chance, indemnity rules were developed
6
based on the notion that the parties were not in equal fault (in pari delicto) 6
One well recognized rule permits one who is vicariously liable for the
62. 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976); see Palestine Contractors,
Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 1 (1974).
63. 545 S.W.2d at 520. The opinion of the court of civil appeals also contains some
interesting rulings regarding the concept of product defect. Id. at 515-16.
64. For a good discussion of the common law development see Davis, Indemnity Between
Negligent Tortfeasors:A ProposedRationale, 37 IOWA L. REV. 517 (1952); Leflar, Contribution
and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV, 130 (1932).
65. See Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1898).
66. Kampmann v. Rothwell, 101 Tex. 535, 109 S.W. 1089 (1908); City of San Antonio v.
Talerico, 98 Tex. 151,81 S.W. 518 (1904); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 83
Tex. 509, 18 S.W. 956 (1892). More recent Texas cases applying this rule include General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), aff'd,
558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,

writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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negligence of another to have indemnity against the negligent party. 67
Another rule commonly applied, although of questionable value, states that
as between negligent tortfeasors, one found guilty of active negligence has
the obligation to indemnify one guilty of mere passive negligence. 68 This
rule, applicable only to negligent tortfeasors, was rejected by the Supreme
Court of Texas in Austin Road Co. v. Pope.69 That decision adopted instead
a rule that if one co-tortfeasor breached a duty owed only to the plaintiff,
but the other breached a duty owed both to his co-tortfeasor and to the
plaintiff, the latter tortfeasor had the obligation of indemnifying the former.7' Both the active-passive negligence rule and the Texas breach of duty
rule were devised to deal with negligent tortfeasors and were created at a
time when it was not considered appropriate to quantify fault of the parties
to an accident. 7' Therefore some ideas founded purely on negligence theory
cannot be satisfactorily transferred to situations involving a strictly liable
tortfeasor and negligent tortfeasors. Consequently, where defendants are
liable on differing tort theories, present indemnity rules between negligent
tortfeasors should be abrogated in favor of an apportionment of damages
based on quantification of fault; such an approach would parallel the current abolition of exceptions to the contributory negligence defense, such as
last clear chance and discovered peril, under the new comparative negligence scheme. When two or more tortfeasors are at fault they should share
the responsibility to some degree; no one should be entirely responsible.
The initial basis for a move in this direction was established by the holding
in Simmons that the breach of duty rule does not apply to the manufacturer
simply because it breached a warranty obligation or duty to the purchaser.
Unless the supplier's conduct endangers the person or property of the
defendant co-tortfeasor, as well as that of the plaintiff, the breach of duty
rule apparently does not apply.
In virtually all cases, the simplest, fairest, and best way to apportion
damages between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant would
be to divide them equally, even in cases in which the defectively dangerous
product endangers the co-tortfeasor as well as the physically injured party.
Accordingly, the supreme court held in Simmons that article 2212, the
general contribution statute, 72 governs apportionment of damages in such
cases. In so doing, the court rejected application of the contribution provisions of the comparative negligence statute, article 2212a, 73 and limited its
67. Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958) (carrier); WaylanderPeterson Co. v. Great N. Ry., 201 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953) (independent contractor); American
S. Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., Inc., 275 Ala, 51, 151 So. 2d 783 (1963) (servant); Lunderberg v.
Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954) (owner of automobile for driver's conduct).
68. See, e.g., Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Casura, 234 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1956); Daly v.
Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 413
S.W.2d 550 (Mo. App. 1967).
69. 147 Tex. 430, 216 S.W.2d 563 (1949). This position had previously been espoused by
Gus M. Hodges in Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV.
150 (1947). See also Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 130 (1932).
70. 147 Tex. at 433, 216 S.W.2d at 565.
71. See Hodges, supra note 69.
72. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). The provision embodies the equaldivision rule of Palestine Contractors, Inc., v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
73. TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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application to joint tortfeasors to those cases where all parties were negligent.74 Indeed, it is difficult to interpret the comparative negligence statute
to apply to any case except that in which the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent and all the defendants were negligent. While such an interpretation
renders the statute workable, it reaches improper results in many situations
because the plaintiff can be denied all recovery if guilty of the greater
negligence and because of the offset rule in the statute.
In Simmons the court concluded its opinion by predicting that "[a]rticle
2212a and the comparative causation advanced in General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins . . . portend problems which may retard the orderly trial of personal injury and property damage cases. This court respectfully invites
further legislative study and amendments of Articles 2212a and 2212."75 The
court's assessment of the situation is correct, but it is doubtful that the
matters can be resolved solely by the legislature. I would suggest: (1)
abolition of the comparative negligence statute and the substitution of a
principle of pro rata apportionment of damages between tortfeasors, including a negligent victim; (2) the adoption by the Texas Supreme Court and the
legislature of the principle that contributory negligence never bars recovery
but always requires an apportionment of damages between the plaintiff and
the defendants on a pro rata basis, whether strictly liable or liable on a
negligence theory; and (3) the abolition of voluntary assumption of the risk
as a defense to strict liability.
74. 558 S.W.2d at 862-63. The court's construction of article 2212a's contribution provision
was based on the provision's failure expressly to mention the term "strict liability." Id.
75. 558 S.W.2d at 862.

